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Abstract. Hybrid system falsification is an actively studied topic, as a scalable
quality assurance methodology for real-world cyber-physical systems. In falsifi-
cation, one employs stochastic hill-climbing optimization to quickly find a coun-
terexample input to a black-box system model. Quantitative robust semantics is
the technical key that enables use of such optimization. In this paper, we tackle the
so-called scale problem regarding Boolean connectives that is widely recognized
in the community: quantities of different scales (such as speed [km/h] vs. rpm, or
worse, rph) can mask each other’s contribution to robustness. Our solution con-
sists of integration of the multi-armed bandit algorithms in hill climbing-guided
falsification frameworks, with a technical novelty of a new reward notion that we
call hill-climbing gain. Our experiments show our approach’s robustness under
the change of scales, and that it outperforms a state-of-the-art falsification tool.
1 Introduction
Hybrid System Falsification Quality assurance of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is at-
tracting growing attention from both academia and industry, not only because it is
challenging and scientifically interesting, but also due to the safety-critical nature of
many CPS. The combination of physical systems (with continuous dynamics) and dig-
ital controllers (that are inherently discrete) is referred to as hybrid systems, capturing
an important aspect of CPS. To verify hybrid systems is intrinsically hard, because the
continuous dynamics therein leads to infinite search spaces.
More researchers and practitioners are therefore turning to optimization-based falsi-
fication as a quality assurance measure for CPS. The problem is formalized as follows.
The falsification problem
– Given: a model M (that takes an input signal u and
yields an output signalM(u)), and a specification ϕ (a
temporal formula)
– Find: a falsifying input, that is, an input signal u such
that the corresponding outputM(u) violates ϕ
u // M M(u)6|=ϕ ? //
? This is the extended author version of the manuscript with the same name published in the pro-
ceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification (CAV 2019).
The final version is available at www.springer.com. The authors are supported by ERATO
HASUO Metamathematics for Systems Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), JST.
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Table 1: Boolean satisfaction w |= ϕ, and quantitative robustness values Jw, ϕK, of
three signals of speed for the STL formula ϕ ≡ 2[0,30](speed < 120)
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w |= ϕ True True FalseJw, ϕK 30 10 −10
In optimization-based falsification, the above problem is turned into an optimization
problem. It is robust semantics of temporal formulas [12, 17] that makes it possible.
Instead of the Boolean satisfaction relation v |= ϕ, robust semantics assigns a quantityJv, ϕK ∈ R∪{∞,−∞} that tells us, not only whether ϕ is true or not (by the sign), but
also how robustly the formula is true or false. This allows one to employ hill-climbing
optimization: we iteratively generate input signals, in the direction of decreasing ro-
bustness, hoping that eventually we hit negative robustness.
An illustration of robust semantics is in Table 1. We use signal temporal logic
(STL) [12], a temporal logic that is commonly used in hybrid system specification. The
specification says the speed must always be below 120 during the time interval [0, 30].
In the search of an input signal u (e.g. of throttle and brake) whose corresponding out-
putM(u) violates the specification, the quantitative robustness JM(u), ϕK gives much
more information than the Boolean satisfactionM(u) |= ϕ. Indeed, in Table 1, while
Boolean satisfaction fails to discriminate the first two signals, the quantitative robust-
ness indicates a tendency that the second signal is closer to violation of the specification.
In the falsification literature, stochastic algorithms are used for hill-climbing opti-
mization. Examples include simulated annealing (SA), globalized Nelder-Mead (GNM [30])
and covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES [6]). Note that the sys-
tem modelM can be black-box: we have only to observe the correspondence between
input u and outputM(u). Observing an errorM(u′) for some input u′ is sufficient ev-
idence for a system designer to know that the system needs improvement. Besides these
practical advantages, optimization-based falsification is an interesting scientific topic:
it combines two different worlds of formal reasoning and stochastic optimization.
Optimization-based falsification started in [17] and has been developed vigorously [1,
3–5, 9, 11–13, 15, 27, 28, 33, 35, 36]. See [26] for a survey. There are mature tools such
as Breach [11] and S-Taliro [5]; they work with industry-standard Simulink models.
Challenge: The Scale Problem in Boolean Superposition In the field of hybrid falsification—
and more generally in search-based testing—the following problem is widely recog-
nized. We shall call the problem the scale problem (in Boolean superposition).
Consider an STL specification ϕ ≡ 2[0,30](¬(rpm > 4000) ∨ (speed > 20))
for a car; it is equivalent to 2[0,30]((rpm > 4000) → (speed > 20)) and says that
the speed should not be too small whenever the rpm is over 4000. According to the
usual definition in the literature [11, 17], the Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ are inter-
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preted by − and the supremum unionsq, respectively; and the “always” operator 2[0,30] is by
infimum
⊔
. Therefore the robust semantics of ϕ under the signal (rpm, speed), where
rpm, speed : [0, 30]→ R, is given as follows.
J(rpm, speed), ϕK = dt∈[0,30] ( (4000− rpm(t)) unionsq (speed(t)− 20) ) (1)
A problem is that, in the supremum of two real values in (1), one component can totally
mask the contribution of the other. In this specific example, the former (rpm) compo-
nent can have values as big as thousands, while the latter (speed ) component will be
in the order of tens. This means that in hill-climbing optimization it is hard to use the
information of both signals, as one will be masked.
Another related problem is that the efficiency of a falsification algorithm would
depend on the choice of units of measure. Imagine replacing rpm with rph in (1), which
makes the constant 4000 into 240000, and make the situation even worse.
These problems—that we call the scale problem—occur in many falsification ex-
amples, specifically when a specification involves Boolean connectives. We do need
Boolean connectives in specifications: for example, many real-world specifications in
industry are of the form 2I(ϕ1 → ϕ2), requiring that an event ϕ1 triggers a counter-
measure ϕ2 all the time.
One could use different operators for interpreting Boolean connectives. For exam-
ple, in [21], ∨ and ∧ are interpreted by + and × over R, respectively. However, these
choices do not resolve the scale problem, either. In general, it does not seem easy to
come up with a fixed set of operators over R that interpret Boolean connectives and are
free from the scale problem.
ϕ1 ϕ2
Fig. 1: A multi-armed bandit
for falsifying 2I(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ1)
Contribution: Integrating Multi-Armed Bandits into
Optimization-Based Falsification As a solution to
the scale problem in Boolean superposition that we
just described, we introduce a new approach that does
not superpose robustness values. Instead, we integrate
multi-armed bandits (MAB) in the existing framework
of falsification guided by hill-climbing optimization.
The MAB problem is a prototypical reinforcement learning problem: a gambler sits
in front of a row of slot machines; their performance (i.e. average reward) is not known;
the gambler plays a machine in each round and he continues with many rounds; and the
goal is to optimize cumulative rewards. The gambler needs to play different machines
and figure out their performance, at the cost of the loss of opportunities in the form of
playing suboptimal machines.
In this paper, we focus on specifications of the form 2I(ϕ1∧ϕ2) and 2I(ϕ1∨ϕ2);
we call them (conjunctive/disjunctive) safety properties. We identify an instance of the
MAB problem in the choice of the formula (out of ϕ1, ϕ2) to try to falsify by hill climb-
ing. See Fig. 1. We combine MAB algorithms (such as ε-greedy and UCB1, see §3.2)
with hill-climbing optimization, for the purpose of coping with the scale problem in
Boolean superposition. This combination is made possible by introducing a novel re-
ward notion for MAB, called hill-climbing gain, that is tailored for this purpose.
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We have implemented our MAB-based falsification framework in MATLAB, build-
ing on Breach [11].3 Our experiments with benchmarks from [7, 24, 25] demonstrate
that our MAB-based approach is a viable one against the scale problem. In particular,
our approach is observed to be (almost totally) robust under the change of scaling (i.e.
changing units of measure, such as from rpm to rph that we discussed after the for-
mula (1)). Moreover, for the benchmarks taken from the previous works—they do not
suffer much from the scale problem—our algorithm performs better than the state-of-
the-art falsification tool Breach [11].
Related Work Besides those we mentioned, we shall discuss some related works.
Formal verification approaches to correctness of hybrid systems employ a wide
range of techniques, including model checking, theorem proving, rigorous numerics,
nonstandard analysis, and so on [8, 14, 18, 20, 22, 23, 29, 32]. These are currently not
very successful in dealing with complex real-world systems, due to issues like scalabil-
ity and black-box components.
Our use of MAB in falsification exemplifies the role of the exploration-exploitation
trade-off, the core problem in reinforcement learning. The trade-off has been already
discussed in some works on falsification. A recent example is [35], where they use
Monte Carlo tree search to force systematic exploration of the space of input signals.
Besides MCTS, Gaussian process learning (GP learning) has also attracted attention
in machine learning as a clean way of balancing exploitation and exploration. The GP-
UCB algorithm is a widely used strategy there. Its use in hybrid system falsification is
pursued e.g. in [3, 33].
More generally, coverage-guided falsification [1, 9, 13, 28] aims at coping with the
exploration-exploitation trade-off. One can set the current work in this context—the
difference is that we force systematic exploration on the specification side, not in the
input space.
There have been efforts to enhance expressiveness of MTL and STL, so that engi-
neers can express richer intentions—such as time robustness and frequency—in speci-
fications [2,31]. This research direction is orthogonal to ours; we plan to investigate the
use of such logics in our current framework.
A similar masking problem around Boolean connectives is discussed in [10, 19].
Compared to those approaches, our technique does not need the explicit declaration of
input vacuity and output robustness, but it relies on the “hill-climbing gain” reward to
learn the significance of each signal.
Finally, the interest in the use of deep neural networks is rising in the field of falsi-
fication (as well as in many other fields). See e.g. [4, 27].
2 Preliminaries: Hill Climbing-Guided Falsification
We review a well-adopted methodology for hybrid system falsification, namely the one
guided by hill-climbing optimization. It makes essential use of quantitative robust se-
mantics of temporal formulas, which we review too.
3 Code obtained at https://github.com/decyphir/breach.
Multi-Armed Bandits for Boolean Connectives in Hybrid System Falsification 5
2.1 Robust Semantics for STL
Our definitions here are taken from [12, 17].
Definition 1 ((time-bounded) signal). Let T ∈ R+ be a positive real. AnM -dimensional
signal with a time horizon T is a function w : [0, T ]→ RM .
Let w : [0, T ] → RM and w′ : [0, T ′] → RM be M -dimensional signals. Their
concatenation w · w′ : [0, T + T ′] → RM is the M -dimensional signal defined by
(w ·w′)(t) = w(t) if t ∈ [0, T ], and (w ·w′)(t) = w′(t− T ) if t ∈ (T, T + T ′].
Let 0 < T1 < T2 ≤ T . The restrictionw|[T1,T2] : [0, T2−T1]→ RM ofw : [0, T ]→
RM to the interval [T1, T2] is defined by (w|[T1,T2])(t) = w(T1 + t).
One main advantage of optimization-based falsification is that a system model can be a
black box—observing the correspondence between input and output suffices. We there-
fore define a system model simply as a function.
Definition 2 (system modelM). A system model, with M -dimensional input and N -
dim. output, is a function M that takes an input signal u : [0, T ] → RM and returns
a signal M(u) : [0, T ] → RN . Here the common time horizon T ∈ R+ is arbitrary.
Furthermore, we impose the following causality condition onM: for any time-bounded
signals u : [0, T ] → RM and u′ : [0, T ′] → RM , we require that M(u · u′)∣∣
[0,T ]
=
M(u).
Definition 3 (STL syntax). We fix a set Var of variables. In STL, atomic propositions
and formulas are defined as follows, respectively: α ::≡ f(x1, . . . , xN ) > 0, and
ϕ ::≡ α | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ ϕ | ϕ∨ ϕ | ϕ UI ϕ. Here f is an N -ary function f : RN → R,
x1, . . . , xN ∈ Var, and I is a closed non-singular interval in R≥0, i.e. I = [a, b] or
[a,∞) where a, b ∈ R and a < b.
We omit subscripts I for temporal operators if I = [0,∞). Other common connec-
tives such as→,>, 2I (always) and 3I (eventually), are introduced as abbreviations:
3Iϕ ≡ > UI ϕ and 2Iϕ ≡ ¬3I¬ϕ. An atomic formula f(x) ≤ c, where c ∈ R, is
accommodated using ¬ and the function f ′(x) := f(x)− c.
Definition 4 (robust semantics [12]). Let w : [0, T ] → RN be an N -dimensional
signal, and t ∈ [0, T ). The t-shift of w, denoted by wt, is the time-bounded signal
wt : [0, T − t]→ RN defined by wt(t′) := w(t+ t′).
Let w : [0, T ] → R|Var| be a signal, and ϕ be an STL formula. We define the
robustness Jw, ϕK ∈ R ∪ {∞,−∞} as follows, by induction on the construction of
formulas. Here
d
and
⊔
denote infimums and supremums of real numbers, respectively.
Their binary version u and unionsq denote minimum and maximum.
Jw, f(x1, · · · , xn) > 0K := f(w(0)(x1), · · · ,w(0)(xn))Jw,⊥K := −∞ Jw,¬ϕK := −Jw, ϕKJw, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2K := Jw, ϕ1K u Jw, ϕ2K Jw, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2K := Jw, ϕ1K unionsq Jw, ϕ2K (2)Jw, ϕ1 UI ϕ2K := ⊔t∈I∩[0,T ]( Jwt, ϕ2K udt′∈[0,t)Jwt′ , ϕ1K )
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For atomic formulas, Jw, f(x) > cK stands for the vertical margin f(x)− c for the
signal w at time 0. A negative robustness value indicates how far the formula is from
being true. It follows from the definition that the robustness for the eventually modality
is given by Jw,3[a,b](x > 0)K = ⊔t∈[a,b]∩[0,T ]w(t)(x).
The above robustness notion taken from [12] is therefore spatial. Other robustness
notions take temporal aspects into account, too, such as “how long before the deadline
the required event occurs.” See e.g. [2,12]. Our choice of spatial robustness in this paper
is for the sake of simplicity, and is thus not essential.
The original semantics of STL is Boolean, given as usual by a binary relation |=
between signals and formulas. The robust semantics refines the Boolean one in the
following sense: Jw, ϕK > 0 implies w |= ϕ, and Jw, ϕK < 0 implies w 6|= ϕ,
see [17, Prop. 16]. Optimization-based falsification via robust semantics hinges on this
refinement.
2.2 Hill Climbing-Guided Falsification
As we discussed in the introduction, the falsification problem attracts growing industrial
and academic attention. Its solution methodology by hill-climbing optimization is an
established field, too: see [1, 3, 5, 9, 11–13, 15, 26, 28, 33, 36] and the tools Breach [11]
and S-TaLiRo [5]. We formulate the problem and the methodology, for later use in
describing our multi-armed bandit-based algorithm.
Definition 5 (falsifying input). LetM be a system model, and ϕ be an STL formula.
A signal u : [0, T ] → R|Var| is a falsifying input if JM(u), ϕK < 0; the latter implies
M(u) 6|= ϕ.
The use of quantitative robust semantics JM(u), ϕK ∈ R ∪ {∞,−∞} in the above
problem enables the use of hill-climbing optimization.
Definition 6 (hill climbing-guided falsification). Assume the setting in Def. 5. For
finding a falsifying input, the methodology of hill climbing-guided falsification is pre-
sented in Algorithm 1.
Here the function HILL-CLIMB makes a guess of an input signal uk, aiming at min-
imizing the robustness JM(uk), ϕK. It does so, learning from the previous observations(
ul, JM(ul), ϕK )l∈[1,k−1] of input signals u1, . . . ,uk−1 and their corresponding ro-
bustness values (cf. Table 1).
The HILL-CLIMB function can be implemented by various stochastic optimization al-
gorithms. Examples are CMA-ES [6] (used in our experiments), SA, and GNM [30].
3 Our Multi-Armed Bandit-Based Falsification Algorithm
In this section, we present our contribution, namely a falsification algorithm that ad-
dresses the scale problem in Boolean superposition (see §1). The main novelties in the
algorithm are as follows.
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Algorithm 1 Hill climbing-guided falsification
Require: a system modelM, an STL formula ϕ, and a budget K
1: function HILL-CLIMB-FALSIFY(M, ϕ,K)
2: rb←∞ ; k ← 0 . rb is the smallest robustness so far, initialized to∞
3: while rb ≥ 0 and k ≤ K do
4: k ← k + 1
5: uk ← HILL-CLIMB
( (
ul, JM(ul), ϕK )l∈[1,k−1] )
6: rbk ← JM(uk), ϕK
7: if rbk < rb then rb← rbk
8: u←
{
uk if rb < 0, that is, rbk = JM(uk), ϕK < 0
Failure otherwise, that is, no falsifying input found within budget K
9: return u
1. (Use of MAB algorithms) For binary Boolean connectives, unlike most works in
the field, we do not superpose the robustness values of the constituent formulas ϕ1
and ϕ2 using a fixed operator (such asu andunionsq in (2)). Instead, we view the situation
as an instance of the multi-armed bandit problem (MAB): we use an algorithm for
MAB to choose one formula ϕi to focus on (here i ∈ {1, 2}); and then we apply
hill climbing-guided falsification to the chosen formula ϕi.
2. (Hill-climbing gain as rewards in MAB) For our integration of MAB and hill-
climbing optimization, the technical challenge is find a suitable notion of reward
for MAB. We introduce a novel notion that we call hill-climbing gain: it formulates
the (downward) robustness gain that we would obtain by applying hill-climbing
optimization, suitably normalized using the scale of previous robustness values.
Later, in §4, we demonstrate that combining those two features gives rise to falsification
algorithms that successfully cope with the scale problem in Boolean superposition.
Our algorithms focus on a fragment of STL as target specifications. They are called
(disjunctive and conjunctive) safety properties. In §3.1 we describe this fragment of
STL, and introduce necessary adaptation of the semantics. After reviewing the MAB
problem in §3.2, we present our algorithms in §3.3–3.4.
3.1 Conjunctive and Disjunctive Safety Properties
Definition 7 (conjunctive/disjunctive safety property). An STL formula of the form
2I(ϕ1∧ϕ2) is called a conjunctive safety property; an STL formula of the form2I(ϕ1∨
ϕ2) is called a disjunctive safety property.
It is known that, in industry practice, a majority of specifications is of the form
2I(ϕ1 → ϕ2), where ϕ1 describes a trigger and ϕ2 describes a countermeasure that
should follow. This property is equivalent to 2I(¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), and is therefore a disjunc-
tive safety property.
In §3.3–3.4, we present two falsification algorithms, for conjunctive and disjunctive
safety properties respectively. For the reason we just discussed, we expect the disjunc-
tive algorithm should be more important in real-world application scenarios. In fact, the
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disjunctive algorithm turns out to be more complicated, and it is best introduced as an
extension of the conjunctive algorithm.
We define the restriction of robust semantics to a (sub)set of time instants. Note that
we do not require S ⊆ [0, T ] to be a single interval.
Definition 8 (Jw, ψKS , robustness restricted to S ⊆ [0, T ] ). Let w : [0, T ]→ R|Var|
be a signal, ψ be an STL formula, and S ⊆ [0, T ] be a subset. We define the robustness
of w under ψ restricted to S by
Jw, ψKS := dt∈S Jwt, ψK . (3)
Obviously, Jw, ψKS < 0 implies that there exists t ∈ S such that Jwt, ψKS < 0. We
derive the following easy lemma; it is used later in our algorithm.
Lemma 9. In the setting of Def. 8, consider a disjunctive safety property ϕ ≡ 2I(ϕ1∨
ϕ2), and let S := {t ∈ I ∩ [0, T ] | Jwt, ϕ1K < 0}. Then Jw, ϕ2KS < 0 impliesJw,2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)K < 0. uunionsq
3.2 The Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) Problem
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem describes a situation where,
– a gambler sits in front of a row A1, . . . , An of slot machines;
– each slot machine Ai gives, when its arm is played (i.e. in each attempt), a reward
according to a prescribed (but unknown) probability distribution µi;
– and the goal is to maximize the cumulative reward after a number of attempts,
playing a suitable arm in each attempt.
The best strategy of course is to keep playing the best arm Amax, i.e. the one whose
average reward avg(µmax) is the greatest. This best strategy is infeasible, however,
since the distributions µ1, . . . , µn are initially unknown. Therefore the gambler must
learn about µ1, . . . , µn through attempts.
The MAB problem exemplifies the “learning by trying” paradigm of reinforcement
learning, and is thus heavily studied. The greatest challenge is to balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation. A greedy (i.e. exploitation-only) strategy will play the arm
whose empirical average reward is the maximum. However, since the rewards are ran-
dom, this way the gambler can miss another arm whose real performance is even better
but which is yet to be found so. Therefore one needs to mix exploration, too, occasion-
ally trying empirically non-optimal arms, in order to identity their true performance.
The relevance of MAB to our current problem is as follows. Falsifying a conjunctive
safety property 2I(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) amounts to finding a time instant t ∈ I at which either ϕ1
or ϕ2 is falsified. We can see the two subformulas (ϕ1 and ϕ2) as two arms, and this
constitutes an instance of the MAB problem. In particular, playing an arm translates to
a falsification attempt by hill climbing, and collecting rewards translates to spending
time to minimize the robustness. We show in §3.3–3.4 that this basic idea extends to
disjunctive safety properties 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), too.
A rigorous formulation of the MAB problem is presented for the record.
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Algorithm 2 The ε-greedy algorithm for multi-armed bandits
Require: the setting of Def. 10, and a constant ε > 0 (typically very small)
At the k-th attempt, choose the arm Aik as follows
1: jemp-opt ← arg max
j∈[1,n]
R(j, k − 1) . the arm that is empirically optimal
2: Sample ik ∈ [1, n] from the distribution[
jemp-opt 7−→ (1− ε) + εn
j 7−→ ε
n
for each j ∈ [1, n] \ {jemp-opt}
]
3: return ik
Definition 10 (the multi-armed bandit problem). The multi-armed bandit (MAB)
problem is formulated as follows.
Input: arms (A1, . . . , An), the associated probability distributions µ1, . . . , µn over R,
and a time horizon H ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Goal: synthesize a sequenceAi1Ai2 . . . AiH , so that the cumulative reward
∑H
k=1 rewk
is maximized. Here the reward rewk of the k-th attempt is sampled from the distribution
µik associated with the arm Aik played at the k-th attempt.
We introduce some notations for later use. Let (Ai1 . . . Aik , rew1 . . . rewk) be a his-
tory, i.e. the sequence of arms played so far (here i1, . . . , ik ∈ [1, n]), and the sequence
of rewards obtained by those attempts (rewl is sampled from µil ).
For an arm Aj , its visit count N(j, Ai1Ai2 . . . Aik , rew1rew2 . . . rewk) is given
by the number of occurrences of Aj in Ai1Ai2 . . . Aik . Its empirical average reward
R(j, Ai1Ai2 . . . Aik , rew1rew2 . . . rewk) is given by
∑
l∈{l∈[1,k]|il=j} rewl, i.e. the av-
erage return of the arm Aj in the history. When the history is obvious from the context,
we simply write N(j, k) and R(j, k).
MAB Algorithms There have been a number of algorithms proposed for the MAB
problem; each of them gives a strategy (also called a policy) that tells which arm to
play, based on the previous attempts and their rewards. The focus here is how to resolve
the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Here we review two well-known algorithms.
The ε-Greedy Algorithm This is a simple algorithm that spares a small fraction ε of
chances for empirically non-optimal arms. The spared probability ε is uniformly dis-
tributed. See Algorithm 2.
The UCB1 Algorithm The UCB1 (upper confidence bound) algorithm is more complex;
it comes with a theoretical upper bound for regrets, i.e. the gap between the expected
cumulative reward and the optimal (but infeasible) cumulative reward (i.e. the result of
keep playing the optimal arm Amax). It is known that the UCB1 algorithm’s regret is
at most O(
√
nH logH) after H attempts, improving the naive random strategy (which
has the expected regret O(H)).
See Alg. 3. The algorithm is deterministic, and picks the arm that maximizes the
value shown in Line 1. The first term R(j, k − 1) is the exploitation factor, reflecting
the arm’s empirical performance. The second term is the exploration factor. Note that
it is bigger if the arm Aj has been played less frequently. Note also that the exploration
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Algorithm 3 The UCB1 algorithm for multi-armed bandits
Require: the setting of Def. 10, and a constant c > 0
At the k-th attempt, choose the arm Aik as follows
1: ik ← arg max
j∈[1,n]
(
R(j, k − 1) + c
√
2 ln(k−1)
N(j,k−1)
)
2: return ik
Algorithm 4 Our MAB-guided algorithm I: conjunctive safety properties
Require: a system modelM, an STL formula ϕ ≡ 2I(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), and a budget K
1: function MAB-FALSIFY-CONJ-SAFETY(M, ϕ,K)
2: rb←∞ ; k ← 0
. rb is the smallest robustness seen so far, for either 2Iϕ1 or 2Iϕ2
3: while rb ≥ 0 and k ≤ K do . iterate if not yet falsified, and within budget
4: k ← k + 1
5: ik ← MAB
(
(ϕ1, ϕ2),
(R(ϕ1),R(ϕ2)), ϕi1 . . . ϕik−1 , rew1 . . . rewk−1 )
. an MAB choice of ik ∈ {1, 2} for optimizing the rewardR(ϕik )
6: uk ← HILL-CLIMB
( (
(ul, rbl)
)
l∈[1,k−1] such that il=ik
)
. suggestion of the next input uk by hill climbing, based on the previous observa-
tions on the formula ϕik (those on the other formula are ignored)
7: rbk ← JM(uk),2IϕikK
8: if rbk < rb then rb← rbk
9: u←
{
uk if rb < 0
Failure otherwise, that is, no falsifying input found within budget K
10: return u
Algorithm 5 Our MAB-guided algorithm II: disjunctive safety properties
Require: a system modelM, an STL formula ϕ ≡ 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), and a budget K
1: function MAB-FALSIFY-DISJ-SAFETY(M, ϕ,K)
The same as Algorithm 4, except that Line 7 is replaced by the following Line 7’.
7’: rbk ← JM(uk), ϕikKSk where Sk = { t ∈ I ∩ [0, T ] ∣∣ JM(utk), ϕikK < 0}
. here ϕik denotes the other formula than ϕik , among ϕ1, ϕ2
factor eventually decays over time: the denominator grows roughly with O(k), while
the numerator grows with O(ln k).
3.3 Our MAB-Guided Algorithm I: Conjunctive Safety Properties
Our first algorithm targets at conjunctive safety properties. It is based on our identifi-
cation of MAB in a Boolean conjunction in falsification—this is as we discussed just
above Def. 10. The technical novelty lies in the way we combine MAB algorithms and
hill-climbing optimization; specifically, we introduce the notion of hill-climbing gain
as a reward notion in MAB (Def. 11). This first algorithm paves the way to the one for
disjunctive safety properties, too (§3.4).
The algorithm is in Algorithm 4. Some remarks are in order.
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Algorithm 4 aims to falsify a conjunctive safety property ϕ ≡ 2I(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2). Its
overall structure is to interleave two sequences of falsification attempts, both of which
are hill climbing-guided. These two sequences of attempts aim to falsify 2Iϕ1 and
2Iϕ2, respectively. Note that JM(u), ϕK ≤ JM(u),2Iϕ1K, therefore falsification of
2Iϕ1 implies falsification of ϕ; the same holds for 2Iϕ2, too.
In Line 5 we run an MAB algorithm to decide which of 2Iϕ1 and 2Iϕ2 to target at
in the k-th attempt. The function MAB takes the following as its arguments: 1) the list
of arms, given by the formulas ϕ1, ϕ2; 2) their rewards R(ϕ1),R(ϕ2); 3) the history
ϕi1 . . . ϕik−1 of previously played arms (il ∈ {1, 2}); and 4) the history rew1 . . . rewk−1
of previously observed rewards. This way, the type of the MAB function in Line 5
matches the format in Def. 10, and thus the function can be instantiated with any MAB
algorithm such as Algorithms 2–3.
The only missing piece is the definition of the rewardsR(ϕ1),R(ϕ2). We introduce
the following notion, tailored for combining MAB and hill climbing.
Definition 11 (hill-climbing gain). In Algorithm 4, in Line 5, the rewardR(ϕi) of the
arm ϕi (where i ∈ {1, 2}) is defined by
R(ϕi) =

max-rb(i, k − 1)− last-rb(i, k − 1)
max-rb(i, k − 1) if ϕi has been played before
0 otherwise
Here max-rb(i, k − 1) := max{rbl | l ∈ [1, k − 1], il = i} (i.e. the greatest rbl so far,
in those attempts where ϕi was played), and last-rb(i, k − 1) := rbllast with llast being
the greatest l ∈ [1, k − 1] such that il = i (i.e. the last rbl for ϕi).
Since we try to minimize the robustness values rbl through falsification attempts, we
can expect that rbl for a fixed arm ϕi decreases over time. (In the case of the hill-
climbing algorithm CMA-ES that we use, this is in fact guaranteed). Therefore the value
max-rb(i, k − 1) in the definition of R(ϕi) is the first observed robustness value. The
numerator max-rb(i, k − 1) − last-rb(i, k − 1) then represents how much robustness
we have reduced so far by hill climbing—hence the name “hill-climbing gain.” The
denominator max-rb(i, k − 1) is there for normalization.
In Algorithm 4, the value rbk is given by the robustness JM(uk),2IϕikK. Therefore
the MAB choice in Line 5 essentially picks ik for which hill climbing yields greater
effect (but also taking exploration into account—see §3.2).
In Line 6 we conduct hill-climbing optimization—see §2.2. The function HILL-CLIMB
learns from the previous attempts ul1 , . . . ,ulm regarding the same formula ϕik , and
their resulting robustness values rbl1 , . . . , rblm . Then it suggests the next input signal
uk that is likely to minimize the (unknown) function that underlies the correspondences[
ulj 7→ rblj
]
j∈[1,m].
Lines 6–8 read as follows: the hill-climbing algorithm suggests a single input uk,
which is then selected or rejected (Line 8) based on the robustness value it yields
(Line 7). We note that this is a simplified picture: in our implementation that uses CMA-
ES (it is an evolutionary algorithm), we maintain a population of some ten particles, and
each of them is moved multiple times (our choice is three times) before the best one is
chosen as uk.
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3.4 Our MAB-Guided Algorithm II: Disjunctive Safety Properties
The other main algorithm of ours aims to falsify a disjunctive safety property ϕ ≡
2I(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2). We believe this problem setting is even more important than the conjunc-
tive case, since it encompasses conditional safety properties (i.e. of the form 2I(ϕ1 →
ϕ2)). See §3.1 for discussions.
In the disjunctive setting, the challenge is that falsification of2Iϕi (with i ∈ {1, 2})
does not necessarily imply falsification of 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). This is unlike the conjunctive
setting. Therefore we need some adaptation of Algorithm 4, so that the two interleaved
sequences of falsification attempts for ϕ1 and ϕ2 are not totally independent of each
other. Our solution consists of restricting time instants to those where ϕ2 is false, in a
falsification attempt for ϕ1 (and vice versa), in the way described in Def. 8.
Algorithm 5 shows our MAB-guided algorithm for falsifying a disjunctive safety
property 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). The only visible difference is that Line 7 in Algorithm 4 is
replaced with Line 7’. The new Line 7’ measures the quality of the suggested input
signal uk in the way restricted to the region Sk in which the other formula is already
falsified. Lem. 9 guarantees that, if rbk < 0, then indeed the input signal uk falsifies
the original specification 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
The assumption that makes Alg. 5 sensible is that, although it can be hard to find a
time instant at which both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are false (this is required in falsifying 2I(ϕ1 ∨
ϕ2)), falsifying ϕ1 (or ϕ2) individually is not hard. Without this assumption, the region
Sk in Line 7’ would be empty most of the time. Our experiments in §4 demonstrate that
this assumption is valid in many problem instances, and that Alg. 5 is effective.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We name MAB-UCB and MAB--greedy the two versions of MAB algorithm using
strategies ε-Greedy (see Alg. 2) and UCB1 (see Alg. 3). We compared the proposed
approach (both versions MAB-UCB and MAB--greedy) with a state-of-the-art falsi-
fication framework, namely Breach [11]. Breach encapsulates several hill-climbing
optimization algorithms, including CMA-ES (covariance matrix adaptation evolution
strategy) [6], SA (simulated annealing), GNM (global Nelder-Mead) [30], etc. Accord-
ing to our experience, CMA-ES outperforms other hill-climbing solvers in Breach, so
the experiments for both Breach and our approach rely on the CMA-ES solver.
Experiments have been executed using Breach 1.2.13 on an Amazon EC2 c4.large
instance, 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2666, 2 virtual CPU cores, 4 GB RAM.
Benchmarks We selected three benchmark models from the literature, each one hav-
ing different specifications. The first one is the Automatic Transmission (AT) model [16,
24]. It has two input signals, throttle∈[0, 100] and brake∈[0, 325], and computes the
car’s speed , engine rotation in rounds per minute rpm , and the automatically selected
gear . The specifications concern the relation between the three output signals to check
whether the car is subject to some unexpected or unsafe behaviors. The second bench-
mark is the Abstract Fuel Control (AFC) model [16, 25]. It takes two input signals,
pedal angle∈[8.8, 90] and engine speed∈[900, 1100], and outputs the critical signal air-
fuel ratio (AF ), which influences fuel efficiency and car performance. The value is
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Table 2: Benchmark sets Bbench and Sbench
(a) Bbench (here δt′(w) represents wt(t′)−wt(0)).
Bench Specification Parameter
ID Formula
AT
AT1 2[0,30]((gear = 3)→ (speed > ρ)) ρ ∈ {20.6, 20.4, 20.2, 20, 19.8}
AT2 2[0,30]((gear = 4)→ (speed > ρ)) ρ ∈ {43, 41, 39, 37, 35}
AT3 2[0,30]((gear = 4)→ (rpm > ρ)) ρ ∈ {700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100}
AT4 2[0,30−τ ]((δ10(rpm) > 2000)→ (δτ (gear) > 0)) τ ∈ {15, 16, 17, 18, 19}
AT5 2[0,30]((speed < ρ) ∧ (RPM < 4780)) ρ ∈ {130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137}
AT6 2[0,26]((δ4(speed) > ρ)→ (δ4(gear) > 0)) ρ ∈ {20, 25, 30, 35, 40}
AT7 2[0,30−τ ]((δτ (speed) > 30)→ (δτ (gear) > 0)) τ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
AFC
AFC1 2[11,50]((controller mode = 0)→ (mu < ρ)) ρ ∈ {0.16, 0.17, 0.18, 0.19, 0.2}
AFC2 2[11,50]((controller mode = 1)→ (mu < ρ)) ρ ∈ {0.222, 0.224, 0.226, 0.228, 0.23}
close ≡ |Pos−Ref | <= ρ+ α ∗ |Ref |
reach ≡ 3[0,2](2[0,1](close))
NN
NN1 2[0,18](¬close→ reach), α = 0.04 ρ ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005}
NN1 2[0,18](¬close→ reach), α = 0.03 ρ ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004, 0.005}
(b) Sbench
Spec ID scaled factor 10k
output
AT11
speed k ∈{-2,0,1,3}
AT12
AT13
AT14
AT15
AT54
speed k ∈{-2,0,1,3}
AT55
AT56
AT57
AT58
AFC11
mu k ∈{0,1,2,3}
AFC12
AFC13
AFC14
AFC15
expected to be close to a reference value AFref ; mu≡|AF−AFref |/AFref is the devia-
tion of AF from AFref . The specifications check whether this property holds under
both normal mode and power enrichment mode. The third benchmark is a model of a
magnetic levitation system with a NARMA-L2 neurocontroller (NN) [7,16]. It takes one
input signal, Ref ∈[1, 3], which is the reference for the output signal Pos , the position
of a magnet suspended above an electromagnet. The specifications say that the position
should approach the reference signal in a few seconds when these two are not close.
We built the benchmark set Bbench, as shown in Table 2a that reports the name of
the model and its specifications (ID and formula). In total, we found 11 specifications.
In order to increase the benchmark set and obtain specifications of different complexity,
we artificially modified a constant (turned into a parameter named τ if it is contained
in a time interval, named ρ otherwise) of the specification: for each specification S, we
generated m different versions, named as Si with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; the complexity of
the specification (in terms of difficulty to falsify it) increases with increasing i.4 In total,
we produced 60 specifications. Column parameter in the table shows which concrete
values we used for the parameters ρ and τ . Note that all the specifications but one are
disjunctive safety properties (i.e., 2I(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)), as they are the most difficult case and
they are the main target of our approach; we just add AT5 as example of conjunctive
safety property (i.e., 2I(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)).
Our approach has been proposed with the aim of tackling the scale problem. There-
fore, to better show how our approach mitigates this problem, we generated a second
benchmark set Sbench as follows. We selected 15 specifications from Bbench (with
concrete values for the parameters) and, for each specification S, we changed the cor-
responding Simulink model by multiplying one of its outputs by a factor 10k, with
k ∈ {−2, 0, 1, 2, 3} (note that we also include the original one using scale factor 100);
the specification has been modified accordingly, by multiplying with the scale factor the
constants that are compared with the scaled output. We name a specification S scaled
with factor 10k as Sk. Table 2b reports the IDs of the original specifications, the output
4 Note that we performed this classification based on the falsification results of Breach.
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Table 3: Aggregated results for benchmark sets Bbench and Sbench (SR: # successes
out 30 trials. Time in secs. ∆: percentage difference w.r.t. Breach). Outperformance
cases are highlighted, indicated by positive ∆ of SR, and negative ∆ of time.
Spec. Breach MAB--greedy MAB-UCB
ID SR (/30) time (sec.) SR (/30) time (sec.) SR (/30) time (sec.)
Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg ∆ Min Max Avg ∆ Min Max Avg ∆ Min Max Avg ∆
AT1 14 25 20.2 125 361.2 223.1 24 30 28.6 35.7 62.7 213.4 106.4 −73.4 28 30 29.2 37.8 45.1 146.8 77.4 −97.1
AT2 11 30 20.2 14 390.6 209.8 30 30 30 43.9 11.9 126.3 54.5 −96.9 27 30 29.4 42.2 17.7 92.5 36.8 −112.1
AT3 29 30 29.4 2.3 22.2 14.2 30 30 30 2 2.5 7 3.5 −82.9 30 30 30 2 2.5 3.6 3 −88.6
AT4 18 30 25.8 19.5 265.3 109.6 29 30 29.8 16 7.8 45.1 24.4 −105 30 30 30 16.6 6.2 36.2 22.2 −113.5
AT5 6 23 14.1 203.1 525.9 366.2 26 30 28.5 72.1 35.2 149 93.7 −120.6 26 30 28.2 71.4 37.7 154.1 99.2 −116.8
AT6 5 29 22.8 30.1 509.5 157 21 30 27 28 2.3 300 95.1 −98.3 22 30 27 27.7 2.9 247.3 86.1 −99.4
AT7 15 30 26.6 12.2 314 81.5 20 30 28.6 8.4 2.9 283.9 49.9 −92 23 30 29 10.3 5.5 223.3 42.9 −88.3
AFC1 6 30 14.4 124.8 565.6 413.5 4 28 12 −28.4 171 568.4 446 10.8 5 30 16.4 9.7 98.7 559.8 389.9 −9.3
AFC2 2 30 18 80.7 582.3 343.4 5 30 20 23.8 43.2 547.8 301.9 −23.8 5 30 20 22.9 59.4 568.4 320.5 −11.1
NN1 17 25 20.8 212.9 384.7 292.9 14 27 20.2 −4.5 189.5 422.8 320.3 6.2 17 28 22.6 7.3 148.2 403.3 272.3 −11.8
NN2 27 28 27.2 55.5 93.4 73.1 30 30 30 9.8 11 39.3 26.3 −97.8 30 30 30 9.8 14.6 38.2 27.4 −92.3
AT1−2 30 30 30 42.5 97.4 56.9 28 30 29 −3.4 75.6 178.3 118.7 68.7 28 30 29.4 −2.1 54.3 136.3 80.3 33.3
AT10 14 25 20.2 125 361.2 223.1 24 30 28.6 35.7 62.7 213.4 106.4 −73.4 28 30 29.2 37.8 45.1 146.8 77.4 −97.1
AT11 4 21 15.4 204.5 527.6 310.2 25 30 29 68.4 49 234.7 102.1 −108 27 29 28.2 64.5 77.5 128.7 105.1 −93
AT13 8 24 19.8 164 471.7 240.1 29 30 29.8 44.6 67.5 170.6 101.9 −77.3 29 30 29.4 43.4 55.4 104.8 80.6 −93.6
AT5−2 29 30 29.6 61.1 163.7 102 25 30 27.8 −6.4 76.9 139.5 111.9 12.6 28 30 29.4 −0.7 48.5 131.9 85.7 −17
AT50 6 18 11.2 291.1 525.9 423.1 28 30 28.4 90.5 80.2 151.3 107.4 −117.7 26 30 28 89.4 68.3 154.1 114.9 −114.5
AT51 0 2 0.4 566.4 600 593.3 27 30 28.4 194.8 70.7 184.5 110.3 −138.5 25 30 27.6 194.1 83.1 150 123.7 −131.2
AT53 0 1 0.2 586.4 600 597.3 27 30 28.6 197.2 66.8 163.3 102.5 −142.3 27 29 28 197.2 80.4 160.9 111.9 −137.4
AFC10 6 30 14.4 124.8 565.6 413.5 4 29 16.4 8.5 115.1 559.9 411.1 −2.8 5 30 16.4 9.7 98.7 559.8 389.9 −9.3
AFC11 7 30 16.6 99 548.2 393.3 3 29 10.8 −60.9 198.1 587.6 465.8 24.6 7 29 17.8 10.3 105.7 527.3 354.3 −10.3
AFC12 0 12 5.2 434.4 600 535.8 3 28 11.6 96.2 180.8 577.6 463 −20.7 4 30 17 127 73.7 556.3 374.5 −47.3
AFC13 1 12 4.8 425.7 587.4 532.6 3 30 14.4 109 138 585.5 436.5 −28 7 30 15 113 77.1 553.4 403.7 −39.9
that has been scaled, and the used scaled factors; in total, the benchmark set Sbench
contains 60 specifications .
Experiment In our context, an experiment consists in the execution of an approach A
(either Breach, MAB--greedy, or MAB-UCB) over a specification S for 30 trials,
using different initial seeds. For each experiment, we record the success SR as the num-
ber of trials in which a falsifying input was found, and average execution time of the
trials. Complete experimental results are reported in Appendix A5. We report aggre-
gated results in Table 3. For benchmark set Bbench, it reports aggregated results for
each group of specifications obtained from S (i.e., all the different versions Si obtained
by changing the value of the parameter); for benchmark set Sbench, instead, results
are aggregated for each scaled specification Sk (considering the versions Ski obtained
by changing the parameter value). We report minimum, maximum and average num-
ber of successes SR, and time in seconds. For MAB--greedy and MAB-UCB, both
for SR and time, we also report the average percentage difference6 (∆) w.r.t. to the
corresponding value of Breach.
Comparison In the following, we compare two approachesA1, A2 ∈ {Breach, MAB--
-greedy, MAB-UCB } by comparing the number of their successes SR and average
execution time using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test with 5% level of
5 The code, models, and specifications are available online at https://github.com/
ERATOMMSD/FalStar-MAB.
6 ∆=((m−b)∗100)/(0.5∗(m+b)) where m is the result of MAB and b the one of Breach.
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significance7 [34]; the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in applying A1 A2
in terms of the compared measure (SR or time).
4.1 Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed approach with some research questions.
RQ1 Which is the best MAB algorithm for our purpose?
In § 3.2, we described that the proposed approach can be executed using two differ-
ent strategies for choosing the arm in the MAB problem, namely MAB--greedy and
MAB-UCB. We here assess which one is better in terms of SR and time. From the results
in Table 3, it seems that MAB-UCB provides slightly better performance in terms of SR;
this has been confirmed by the Wilcoxon test applied over all the experiments (i.e., on
the non-aggregated data reported in Appendix A ): the null hypothesis that using anyone
of the two strategies has no impact on SR is rejected with p-value equal to 0.005089, and
the alternative hypothesis that SR is better is accepted with p-value=0.9975; in a simi-
lar way, the null hypothesis that there is no difference in terms of time is rejected with
p-value equal to 3.495e-06, and the alternative hypothesis that is MAB-UCB is faster is
accepted with p-value=1. Therefore, in the following RQs, we compare Breach with
only the MAB-UCB version of our approach.
RQ2 Does the proposed approach effectively solve the scale problem?
We here assess if our approach is effective in tackling the scale problem. Table 4 re-
ports the complete experimental results over Sbench for Breach and MAB-UCB; for
each specification S, all its scaled versions are reported in increasing order of the scal-
ing factor. We observe that changing the scaling factor affects (sometimes greatly) the
number of successes SR of Breach; for example, for AT55 and AT57 it goes from 30 to
0. For MAB-UCB, instead, SR is similar across the scaled versions of each specification:
this shows that the approach is robust w.r.t. to the scale problem as the “hill-climbing
gain” reward in Def. 11 eliminates the impact of scaling and UCB1 algorithm balances
the exploration and exploitation of two sub-formulas. The observation is confirmed by
the Wilcoxon test over SR: the null hypothesis is rejected with p-value=1.808e-09, and
the alternative hypothesis accepted with p-value=1. Instead, the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in terms of time cannot be rejected with p-value=0.3294.
RQ3 How does the proposed process behave with not scaled benchmarks?
In RQ2, we checked whether the proposed approach is able to tackle the scale prob-
lem for which it has been designed. Here, instead, we are interested in investigating
how it behaves on specifications that have not been artificially scaled (i.e., those in
Bbench). From Table 3 (upper part), we observe that MAB-UCB is always better than
Breach both in terms of SR and time, which is shown by the highlighted cases. This
is confirmed by Wilcoxon test over SR and time: null hypotheses are rejected with p-
values equal to, respectively, 6.02e-08 and 1.41e-08, and the alternative hypotheses that
MAB-UCB is better are both accepted with p-value=1. This means that the proposed
7 We checked that the distributions are not normal with the non-parametric Shapiro-Wilk test.
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Table 4: Experimental results – Sbench (SR: # successes out of 30 trials. Time in secs)
Spec. Breach MAB-UCB Spec. Breach MAB-UCB Spec. Breach MAB-UCB
ID SR time SR time ID SR time SR time ID SR time SR time
(/30) (sec.) (/30) (sec.) (/30) (sec.) (/30) (sec.) (/30) (sec.) (/30) (sec.)
AT1−21 30 51.3 30 54.3 AT5
−2
4 30 61.1 30 48.5 AFC1
0
1 30 124.8 30 98.7
AT101 25 125 29 75 AT5
0
4 18 291.1 28 94.5 AFC1
1
1 30 99 29 105.7
AT111 20 221.1 28 107.9 AT5
1
4 2 566.4 25 150 AFC1
2
1 12 434.4 30 73.7
AT131 23 170 29 55.4 AT5
3
4 1 586.4 28 96.2 AFC1
3
1 12 425.7 30 77.1
AT1−22 30 49 29 67.5 AT5
−2
5 30 71.3 29 67.8 AFC1
0
2 16 421.5 23 346.8
AT102 22 187.5 30 45.1 AT5
0
5 15 369.1 27 114 AFC1
1
2 25 345.9 27 227.9
AT112 21 204.5 29 77.5 AT5
1
5 0 600 29 83.1 AFC1
2
2 8 497.2 25 320.5
AT132 24 164 30 61 AT5
3
5 0 600 27 113.8 AFC1
3
2 5 518.1 21 364
AT1−23 30 42.5 30 62.4 AT5
−2
6 29 110.2 28 103.3 AFC1
0
3 11 457.7 15 442
AT103 19 239.5 29 62.5 AT5
0
6 10 438.2 30 68.3 AFC1
1
3 13 479.2 14 455.5
AT113 16 296.2 27 128.7 AT5
1
6 0 600 27 126.7 AFC1
2
3 2 590.7 15 453.2
AT133 21 209.8 30 93.4 AT5
3
6 0 600 29 80.4 AFC1
3
3 5 545.6 8 510.6
AT1−24 30 44.5 30 80.8 AT5
−2
7 30 103.6 30 77.3 AFC1
0
4 9 498.2 9 502.1
AT104 21 202.2 30 57.4 AT5
0
7 7 491.4 26 154.1 AFC1
1
4 8 494 12 455
AT114 16 301.7 28 119.5 AT5
1
7 0 600 27 134.3 AFC1
2
4 4 556.8 11 468.7
AT134 23 185.1 29 88.3 AT5
3
7 0 600 29 108 AFC1
3
4 1 587.4 9 513.4
AT1−25 30 97.4 28 136.3 AT5
−2
8 29 163.7 30 131.9 AFC1
0
5 6 565.6 5 559.8
AT105 14 361.2 28 146.8 AT5
0
8 6 525.9 29 143.6 AFC1
1
5 7 548.2 7 527.3
AT115 4 527.6 29 91.9 AT5
1
8 0 600 30 124.2 AFC1
2
5 0 600 4 556.3
AT135 8 471.7 29 104.8 AT5
3
8 0 600 27 160.9 AFC1
3
5 1 586 7 553.4
approach can also handle specifications that do not suffer from the scale problem, and
so it can be used with any kind of specification.
RQ4 Is the proposed approach more effective than an approach based on rescaling?
A naı¨ve solution to the scale problem could be to rescale the signals used in specifi-
cation at the same scale. Thanks to the results of RQ2, we can compare to this possible
baseline approach, using the scaled benchmark set Sbench. For example, AT5 suffers
from the scale problem as speed is one order of magnitude less than rpm . However,
from Table 3, we observe that the scaling that would be done by the baseline approach
(i.e., running Breach over AT51) is not effective, as SR is 0.4/30, that is much lower
than the original SR 14.1/30 of the unscaled approach using Breach. Our approach,
instead, raises SR to 28.4/30 and to 27.6/30 using the two proposed versions.
The detailed reason is as follows. For example AT516, the specification is
2[0,30](speed < 1350 ∧ rpm < 4780)
After artificial scaling of the speed unit (× 10), the scalings for speed and rpm are
comparable. Therefore, the baseline approach will consist of simply running Breach
for the specification AT516. By monitoring Breach execution, we notice that the naı¨ve
approach fails because it tries to falsify rpm<4780, which, however, is not falsifiable;
our approach, instead, understands that it must try to falsify speed<ρ.
As a result, our MAB-based falsification for Boolean connectives improves effi-
ciency, even in absence of the scale problem. It does so by taking balance between
exploration and exploitation, while original Breach (interpreting ∧ by infimum) is
purely exploiting.
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5 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we propose a solution to the scale problem that affects falsification of spec-
ifications containing Boolean connectives. The approach combines multi-armed bandit
algorithms with hill climbing-guided falsification. Experiments show that the approach
is robust under the change of scales, and it outperforms a state-of-the-art falsification
tool. The approach currently handles binary specifications. As future work, we plan to
generalize it to complex specifications having more than two Boolean connectives.
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A Experimental results
Table 5: Experimental results – Bbench (SR: # successes out 30 trials. Time in secs.
∆: percentage difference w.r.t. Breach)
Spec Breach MAB--greedy MAB-UCBSR time SR time ∆SR ∆time SR time ∆SR ∆time
AT11 25 125 29 77.4 14.8 −47 29 75 14.8 −50
AT12 22 187.5 30 62.7 30.8 −99.7 30 45.1 30.8 −122.4
AT13 19 239.5 30 91.5 44.9 −89.4 29 62.5 41.7 −117.2
AT14 21 202.2 30 87.1 35.3 −79.5 30 57.4 35.3 −111.6
AT15 14 361.2 24 213.4 52.6 −51.4 28 146.8 66.7 −84.4
AT21 30 14 30 11.9 0 −16.2 30 17.7 0 23.3
AT22 26 96.2 30 37.8 14.3 −87.1 30 19 14.3 −134
AT23 20 216.3 30 41.1 40 −136.1 30 23 40 −161.5
AT24 14 331.9 30 55.2 72.7 −143 30 31.9 72.7 −164.9
AT25 11 390.6 30 126.3 92.7 −102.3 27 92.5 84.2 −123.4
AT31 29 21.9 30 7 3.4 −103.6 30 3.6 3.4 −143.6
AT32 30 2.3 30 2.5 0 7.1 30 2.5 0 8.3
AT33 29 22.2 30 2.6 3.4 −158.4 30 3.4 3.4 −146.9
AT34 30 3 30 2.8 0 −5.8 30 2.9 0 −3.4
AT35 29 21.7 30 2.8 3.4 −154 30 2.6 3.4 −157.3
AT41 30 19.5 30 7.8 0 −85.8 30 6.2 0 −103.5
AT42 29 48.1 30 19.5 3.4 −84.4 30 13.3 3.4 −113.4
AT43 29 54.4 30 31.7 3.4 −52.8 30 29.2 3.4 −60.3
AT44 23 160.5 30 17.8 26.4 −160 30 36.2 26.4 −126.4
AT45 18 265.3 29 45.1 46.8 −141.9 30 26.3 50 −163.9
AT51 23 203.1 30 35.2 26.4 −140.9 30 37.7 26.4 −137.4
AT52 16 320.4 26 126.8 47.6 −86.6 30 39.7 60.9 −155.9
AT53 18 290.6 30 46.6 50 −144.7 26 141.6 36.4 −68.9
AT54 18 291.1 27 108.5 40 −91.4 28 94.5 43.5 −102
AT55 15 369.1 29 71.1 63.6 −135.4 27 114 57.1 −105.6
AT56 10 438.2 30 75.3 100 −141.3 30 68.3 100 −146
AT57 7 491.4 28 136.8 120 −112.9 26 154.1 115.2 −104.5
AT58 6 525.9 28 149 129.4 −111.7 29 143.6 131.4 −114.2
AT61 28 46.4 30 2.3 6.9 −180.8 30 2.9 6.9 −176.5
AT62 29 30.1 30 4.3 3.4 −149.5 30 4.3 3.4 −150.1
AT63 25 111.9 30 9.7 18.2 −168.1 30 11.4 18.2 −163
AT64 27 86.9 24 159 −11.8 58.6 23 164.8 −16 61.8
AT65 5 509.5 21 300 123.1 −51.8 22 247.3 125.9 −69.3
AT71 30 12.2 20 283.9 −40 183.5 23 223.3 −26.4 179.2
AT72 15 314 30 33.6 66.7 −161.4 30 43.2 66.7 −151.6
AT73 25 111.9 30 10.5 18.2 −165.6 30 11.4 18.2 −163
AT74 28 51.1 30 2.9 6.9 −178.6 30 5.8 6.9 −159.5
AT75 30 13.5 30 5 0 −91.5 30 5.5 0 −84.1
AT76 30 12.6 30 5.5 0 −78.5 30 5.6 0 −76.2
AT77 28 54.9 30 7.6 6.9 −151.6 30 5.6 6.9 −162.7
AFC11 30 124.8 28 171 −6.9 31.2 30 98.7 0 −23.4
AFC12 16 421.5 15 419.2 −6.5 −0.5 23 346.8 35.9 −19.4
AFC13 11 457.7 8 506.7 −31.6 10.2 15 442 30.8 −3.5
AFC14 9 498.2 5 568.4 −57.1 13.2 9 502.1 0 0.8
AFC15 6 565.6 4 564.7 −40 −0.1 5 559.8 −18.2 −1
AFC21 30 80.7 30 43.2 0 −60.5 30 59.4 0 −30.5
AFC22 29 128.1 30 100.5 3.4 −24.2 30 123.3 3.4 −3.8
AFC23 17 436.1 23 326.1 30 −28.9 24 359.3 34.1 −19.3
AFC24 12 489.9 12 491.9 0 0.4 11 492 −8.7 0.4
AFC25 2 582.3 5 547.8 85.7 −6.1 5 568.4 85.7 −2.4
NN11 25 221.2 27 189.5 7.7 −15.4 28 148.2 11.3 −39.5
NN12 24 212.9 24 212.6 0 −0.1 28 169 15.4 −23
NN13 19 300.1 18 401.9 −5.4 29 19 308.7 0 2.8
NN14 17 384.7 18 374.6 5.7 −2.7 21 332.2 21.1 −14.6
NN15 19 345.5 14 422.8 −30.3 20.1 17 403.3 −11.1 15.4
NN21 27 66.8 30 11 10.5 −143.5 30 14.6 10.5 −128.1
NN22 27 70.7 30 17.3 10.5 −121.4 30 23.7 10.5 −99.5
NN23 28 55.5 30 26 6.9 −72.2 30 27.8 6.9 −66.6
NN24 27 79.1 30 39.3 10.5 −67.3 30 32.5 10.5 −83.5
NN25 27 93.4 30 37.8 10.5 −84.7 30 38.2 10.5 −83.8
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Table 6: Experimental results – Sbench (SR: # successes out 30 trials. Time in secs.
∆: percentage difference w.r.t. Breach)
Spec Breach MAB--greedy MAB-UCBSR time SR time ∆SR ∆time SR time ∆SR ∆time
AT1−21 30 51.3 30 75.6 0 38.3 30 54.3 0 5.6
AT101 25 125 29 77.4 14.8 −47 29 75 14.8 −50
AT111 20 221.1 30 49 40 −127.5 28 107.9 33.3 −68.8
AT131 23 170 30 82.5 26.4 −69.3 29 55.4 23.1 −101.6
AT1−22 30 49 29 115.6 −3.4 80.9 29 67.5 −3.4 31.9
AT102 22 187.5 30 62.7 30.8 −99.7 30 45.1 30.8 −122.4
AT112 21 204.5 30 59.7 35.3 −109.6 29 77.5 32 −90.1
AT132 24 164 30 88.8 22.2 −59.5 30 61 22.2 −91.5
AT1−23 30 42.5 28 144.4 −6.9 109.1 30 62.4 0 38
AT103 19 239.5 30 91.5 44.9 −89.4 29 62.5 41.7 −117.2
AT113 16 296.2 30 72.3 60.9 −121.5 27 128.7 51.2 −78.8
AT133 21 209.8 29 99.9 32 −71 30 93.4 35.3 −76.8
AT1−24 30 44.5 30 79.8 0 56.8 30 80.8 0 57.9
AT104 21 202.2 30 87.1 35.3 −79.5 30 57.4 35.3 −111.6
AT114 16 301.7 30 94.6 60.9 −104.5 28 119.5 54.5 −86.5
AT134 23 185.1 30 67.5 26.4 −93.1 29 88.3 23.1 −70.8
AT1−25 30 97.4 28 178.3 −6.9 58.7 28 136.3 −6.9 33.3
AT105 14 361.2 24 213.4 52.6 −51.4 28 146.8 66.7 −84.4
AT115 4 527.6 25 234.7 144.8 −76.8 29 91.9 151.5 −140.7
AT135 8 471.7 30 170.6 115.8 −93.7 29 104.8 113.5 −127.3
AT5−24 30 61.1 25 139.5 −18.2 78.1 30 48.5 0 −23
AT504 18 291.1 28 106.6 43.5 −92.8 28 94.5 43.5 −102
AT514 2 566.4 29 70.7 174.2 −155.6 25 150 170.4 −116.2
AT534 1 586.4 28 89.3 186.2 −147.1 28 96.2 186.2 −143.6
AT5−25 30 71.3 27 113.8 −10.5 45.9 29 67.8 −3.4 −5.1
AT505 15 369.1 28 98.2 60.5 −115.9 27 114 57.1 −105.6
AT515 0 600 27 115.4 200 −135.5 29 83.1 200 −151.4
AT535 0 600 30 66.8 200 −159.9 27 113.8 200 −136.2
AT5−26 29 110.2 29 76.9 0 −35.5 28 103.3 −3.5 −6.5
AT506 10 438.2 28 100.5 94.7 −125.4 30 68.3 100 −146
AT516 0 600 29 90.8 200 −147.4 27 126.7 200 −130.3
AT536 0 600 30 70 200 −158.2 29 80.4 200 −152.7
AT5−27 30 103.6 28 116.1 −6.9 11.4 30 77.3 0 −29.1
AT507 7 491.4 30 80.2 124.3 −143.9 26 154.1 115.2 −104.5
AT517 0 600 30 90 200 −147.8 27 134.3 200 −126.8
AT537 0 600 27 123.3 200 −131.8 29 108 200 −139
AT5−28 29 163.7 30 113 3.4 −36.7 30 131.9 3.4 −21.6
AT508 6 525.9 28 151.3 129.4 −110.6 29 143.6 131.4 −114.2
AT518 0 600 27 184.5 200 −105.9 30 124.2 200 −131.4
AT538 0 600 28 163.3 200 −114.4 27 160.9 200 −115.4
AFC101 30 124.8 29 115.1 −3.4 −8.1 30 98.7 0 −23.4
AFC111 30 99 29 198.1 −3.4 66.7 29 105.7 −3.4 6.5
AFC121 12 434.4 28 180.8 80 −82.4 30 73.7 85.7 −142
AFC131 12 425.7 30 138 85.7 −102.1 30 77.1 85.7 −138.7
AFC102 16 421.5 23 331.7 35.9 −23.8 23 346.8 35.9 −19.4
AFC112 25 345.9 12 456.8 −70.3 27.6 27 227.9 7.7 −41.1
AFC122 8 497.2 15 446.6 60.9 −10.7 25 320.5 103 −43.2
AFC132 5 518.1 16 438.9 104.8 −16.5 21 364 123.1 −34.9
AFC103 11 457.7 16 531.3 37 14.9 15 442 30.8 −3.5
AFC113 13 479.2 7 514.9 −60 7.2 14 455.5 7.4 −5.1
AFC123 2 590.7 6 554.3 100 −6.4 15 453.2 152.9 −26.3
AFC133 5 545.6 16 472.1 104.8 −14.4 8 510.6 46.2 −6.6
AFC104 9 498.2 4 559.9 −76.9 11.7 9 502.1 0 0.8
AFC114 8 494 3 571.7 −90.9 14.6 12 455 40 −8.2
AFC124 4 556.8 6 555.9 40 −0.2 11 468.7 93.3 −17.2
AFC134 1 587.4 7 547.8 150 −7 9 513.4 160 −13.4
AFC105 6 565.6 10 517.5 50 −8.9 5 559.8 −18.2 −1
AFC115 7 548.2 3 587.6 −80 6.9 7 527.3 0 −3.9
AFC125 0 600 3 577.6 200 −3.8 4 556.3 200 −7.6
AFC135 1 586 3 585.5 100 −0.1 7 553.4 150 −5.7
